Fast Planning in Stochastic Games by Kearns, Michael et al.
UNCERTAINTY IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE PROCEEDINGS 2000 309 
Fast Planning in Stochastic Games 
Michael Kearns 
AT&T Labs 
Florham Park, New Jersey 
mkearns@research.att.com 
Yishay Mansour 
Tel Aviv U ni versi ty 
Tel Aviv, Israel 
mansour@math. tau .ac.il 
Satinder Singh 
AT&T Labs 
Florham Park, New Jersey 
baveja@research.att.com 
Abstract 
Stochastic games generalize Markov decision 
processes (MDPs) to a multiagent setting 
by allowing the state transitions to depend 
jointly on all player actions, and having 
rewards determined by multiplayer matrix 
games at each state. We consider the prob­
lem of computing Nash equilibria in stochas­
tic games, the analogue of planning in MDPs. 
We begin by providing a simple general­
ization of finite-horizon value iteration that 
computes a Nash strategy for each player 
in general-sum stochastic games. The algo­
rithm takes an arbitrary Nash selection func­
tion as input, which allows the translation of 
local choices between multiple Nash equilib­
ria into the selection of a single global Nash 
equilibrium. 
Our main technical result is an algorithm for 
computing near-Nash equilibria in large or in­
finite state spaces. This algorithm builds on 
our finite-horizon value iteration algorithm, 
and adapts the sparse sampling methods of 
Kearns, Mansour and Ng (1999) to stochas­
tic games. We conclude by describing a coun­
terexample showing that infinite-horizon dis­
counted value iteration, which was shown by 
Shapley to converge in the zero-sum case (a 
result we give extend slightly here), does not 
converge in the general-sum case. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
There has been increasing interest in artificial intel­
ligence in multi-agent systems and problems. Fueled 
by the expanding potential for large-scale populations 
of autonomous programs in areas as diverse as online 
trading and auctions, personalized web crawling, and 
many other areas, such work seeks to provide both al­
gorithms and mathematical foundations for agents in 
complex, distributed environments. 
Given the detailed theoretical and practical under­
standing of single-agent planning and learning in 
Markov decision processes (MDPs) that has been built 
over the last decade, one natural line of research is the 
extension of these algorithms and analyses to a multi­
agent setting (Boutilier, Goldszmidt, and Sabata 1999; 
Brafman and Tennenholtz 1999; Hu and Wellman 
1998). The work presented here is a contribution to 
this line. We consider the problem of computing Nash 
equilibria in stochastic games. Stochastic games gen­
eralize MDPs to a multi-agent setting by allowing the 
state transitions to depend jointly on all agent actions, 
and having the immediate rewards at each state de­
termined by a multi-agent general-sum matrix game 
associated with the state. If we view the computation 
of an optimal policy in a given MDP as the problem 
of planning for a single agent's interaction with its 
fixed stochastic environment, the natural analogue in 
a stochastic game would be the computation of a Nash 
equilibrium, which allows all agents to simultaneously 
enjoy a best response policy to the others. 
We begin by providing a generalization of finite­
horizon value iteration in MDPs that computes, in 
time polynomial in the number of states, a Nash strat­
egy for each player in any given two-player 1, general­
sum stochastic game. We introduce the notion of a 
Nash selection function, which is simply a way of ex­
tracting local Nash equilibria from the matrix games 
stored at each state. The key observation behind 
our value iteration generalization is that local appli­
cation of any Nash selection function to the appro­
priate backup matrices will yield a global Nash equi­
librium for the stochastic game. Different global so-
1 For simplicity, we present all of our results for the two­
player case. They can be generalized to the k-player case 
at the cost of a factor exponential in k, which cannot be 
avoided without special assumptions on the game. 
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lutions can be found by varying the underlying Nash 
selection function used by the algorithm. 
We then proceed to present our central technical con­
tribution, which is an online sparse sampling algo­
rithm for computing near-Nash equilibria in general­
sum stochastic games. In the same way that recent 
work of Kearns, Mansour and Ng (1999) provided an 
online planning algorithm for large or infinite MDPs, 
we build on our finite-horizon value iteration and give 
a randomized algorithm for computing each half of a 
Nash policy in a stochastic game for which we have 
only a generative model (the ability to sample the state 
transition distributions and rewards). Like the sparse 
sampling algorithm of Kearns et al. for the MDP case, 
the per-state running time of our algorithm has no de­
pendence on the state space size, but is exponential 
in the horizon time. This provides a rather differ­
ent trade-off than our basic value iteration algorithm, 
whose dependence on the state space size is quadratic, 
but whose dependence on the horizon time is linear. 
Like the earlier work, one can view the new algorithm 
as greatly reducing the width or degree (from linear in 
state space size to constant) of a full look-ahead tree, 
while leaving the depth unchanged. 
The strong guarantee we prove for our algorithm 
is that it computes a near-Nash equilibrium in any 
stochastic game: as long as one player chooses to play 
their half of the output of the algorithm at each state, 
the other player provably has little incentive to de­
viate from playing their half. Since our algorithm is 
randomized (due to the sparse sampling), and because 
of the potential sensitivity of Nash equilibria to small 
fluctuations in the game, it is important that both 
players play according to a common copy of the al­
gorithm. (Technically, this is known as a correlated 
equilibrium.) Our algorithm can thus be viewed as 
providing a centralized solution for the players that is 
near-Nash. 
We close with a discussion of value iteration in the in­
finite horizon discounted case. We give a small gener­
alization of Shapley's proof of convergence in the zero­
sum case, but then provide a rather strong counterex­
ample to convergence in the general sum case, high­
lighting an interesting difference between planning in 
MDPs and planning in stochastic games. 
2 DEFINITIONS A ND NOTATION 
We adopt standard terminology and notation from 
classical game theory. A two-player game is defined 
by a matrix pair (M1, M2), specifying the payoffs for 
the row player (player 1) and the column player (player 
2), respectively. We shall assume without loss of gen­
erality throughout the paper that all game matrices 
M1 and M2 are n by n, and that their indices thus 
range from 1 to n. If the row player chooses the in­
dex (or pure strategy) i and the column player chooses 
the index j, the former receives payoff M1 ( i, j) and 
the latter M2(i,j). More generally, if a and f3 are dis­
tributions (or mixed strategies) over the row and col­
umn indices, the expected payoff to player k E {1, 2} 
is Mk(a, /3) = EiEa:,jE,B[Mk(i, j)], where the notation 
i E a indicates that i is distributed according to a. We 
say that the game (M1, M2) is zero-sum if M2 = -M1. 
The mixed strategy pair (a, /3) is said to be a Nash 
equilibrium (or Nash pair) for the game (M1, M2) if (i) 
for any mixed strategy a', M1(a',/3) � M1(a,/3), and 
(ii) for any mixed strategy /31, M2(a,f3') � M2(a,f3). 
In other words, as long as one player plays their 
half of the Nash pair, the other player has no in­
centive to switch from their half of the Nash pair. 
We will also need the standard notion of approxi­
mate Nash equilibria. Thus, we say that (a, /3) is f.­
Nash for (M1, M2) if (i) for any mixed strategy a', 
M1(a',/3) � M1(a,f3)+€, and (ii) for any mixed strat­
egy /3', M2(a, /3') � M2(a, /3) +f. 
It is well-known (Owen 1995) that every game has 
at least one Nash pair in the space of mixed (but 
not necessarily pure) strategies, and many games have 
multiple Nash pairs. Furthermore, in the zero-sum 
case, if (a, /3) and (a', /3') are both Nash pairs, then 
M1(a,f3) = M1(a',/3'), and (a,/3') and (a',/3) are also 
Nash pairs. In other words, in the zero-sum case, the 
payoff to the players is always the same under any 
Nash pair, and Nash pairs can be freely "mixed" to­
gether to form new Nash pairs. Since in the zero-sum 
case the payoff to the column player is always the neg­
ative of the row player, we can unambiguously refer to 
the value of the game v(MI) = M1(a,{3), where (a,/3) 
is any Nash pair. In the general-sum case, different 
Nash pairs may yield different payoffs to the players, 
and in general Nash pairs cannot be mixed in the man­
ner described. 
The security level for the row player is defined as 
s1(M1,M2) = si (MI) = maxa:min,eMI(a,/3) and 
for the column player as s2(M1, M2) = s2(M2) = 
max,e mina: M2(a, {3). A mixed strategy achieving the 
maximum in each case is referred to as a security strat­
egy for the player. The security level for a player is the 
payoff that player can ensure for themselves regardless 
of their opponent's behavior. In the zero-sum case, 
the notion of Nash pair coincides with that of security 
pair, and the value of a game is simply the security 
level for the row player; in the general case, however, 
the security level of a player may be lower than their 
payoff in a Nash pair. 
A stochastic game G over a state space S consists 
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of a designated start state so E S, a matrix game 
(MI(s], M2[s]) for every state s E S, and transition 
probabilities P(s'Js, i, j) for every s, s' E S, every pure 
row strategy i, and every pure column strategy j. Each 
step of play in a stochastic game proceeds as follows. 
If play is currently in state s and the two players 
play mixed strategies a and /3, then pure strategies 
i and j are chosen according to a and /3 respectively, 
the players receive immediate payoffs MI(s](i, j) and 
M2[s](i, j) (and thus have expected immediate pay­
offs M1[s](a, /3) and M2[s](a, /3)), and the next state 
s' is drawn according to the transition probabilities 
P( ·Js, i, j). Thus both the immediate payoffs to the 
players and the state transition depend on the actions 
of both players. If the game matrices at every state of 
G are zero-sum we say that G is zero-sum. 
We shall consider two different standard measures of 
the overall total return received by the players. In 
the infinite-horizon discounted case, play begins at 
s0 and proceeds forever; if a player receives pay­
offs ro, r1 , r2, . . .  , they are credited with total return 
ro + '")'r1 + ,.,Pr2 + · · · , where 0 :::; "( < 1 is the discount 
factor. In the finite-horizon undiscounted (also called 
the T-step average) case, which is our main interest, 
play begins at s0 and proceeds for exactly T steps; 
if a player receives payoffs r0, r1, r2, . . .  , rr-1 they are 
credited with total return (1/T)(ro+rl +· · ·rr-d- We 
shall use Rmax to denote the largest absolute value of 
any element in the matrices Mk[s]. For ease of exposi­
tion we will often make the assumption that Rmax :::; 1 
without loss of generality. The goal of each player in 
a stochastic game is to maximize their expected total 
return from the designated start state. 
A policy for a player in a stochastic game G is a map­
ping 7r( s) from states s E S to mixed strategies to 
be played at the matrix game at s. A time-dependent 
policy 7r(s, t) allows the mixed strategy chosen to de­
pend on the number t of steps remaining in the T­
step game. It is known (Owen 1995) that we can 
restrict attention to policies (in the infinite-horizon 
discounted case) or time-dependent policies (in the 
finite-horizon case) without loss of generality- that 
is, no advantage can be gained by a player by con­
sidering the history of play. If 1!"1 and 1!"2 are policies 
in a matrix game G with designated start state so, 
we use Gk(so, 1!"1, 7r2), k E {1, 2}, to denote the ex­
pected infinite-horizon discounted return to player k, 
and G k (T, so, 1!"1, 1!"2) to denote the expected T -step 
average return. The notion of Nash pairs extends 
naturally to stochastic games: we say that ( 1!"1, 1!"2) 
is a Nash pair if for any start state s0 and any 1!"�, 
Gl(so, 7l"�, 7r2):::; G1(so, 7l"J, 1l"2), and for any start state 
so and any 1!"�, G2(so, 7l"J, 7l"�) :::; G2(so, 7l"J, 1l"2) (with 
the obvious generalization for the T-step case, and 
the obvious generalization to the notion of t-Nash). 
Again, it is known (Owen 1995) that for the infinite 
discounted case, a Nash pair always exists in the space 
of policies, and for the average return case, a Nash pair 
always exists in the space of time-dependent policies. 
The notions of security level and security policies in a 
stochastic game are defined analogously. The subject 
of this paper is the computation of Nash and t-Nash 
policy pairs in stochastic games, including stochastic 
games with large or infinite state spaces. 
Since the matrix game at any given state in a stochas­
tic game may have many Nash equilibria, it is easy 
to see that there may be exponentially many Nash 
equilibria in policy space for a stochastic game. One 
question we face in this paper is how to turn local de­
cisions at each state into a global Nash or near-Nash 
policy pair. For this we introduce the notion of a Nash 
selection function. For any matrix game (M1, M2), 
a Nash selection function f returns a pair of mixed 
strategies f ( M1, M2) = (a, /3) that are a Nash pair for 
(M1, M2). We denote the payoff to the row player un­
der this Nash pair by v}(M1, M2) = M1(f(M1, M2)) 
and the payoff to the column player by v}(M1, M2) = 
M2(f(M1, M2)). Thus, a Nash selection function ­
which we allow to be arbitrary in most of our results­
is simply a specific way of making choices of how to be­
have in isolated matrix games. Looking ahead slightly, 
we will show how the application of any Nash selection 
function to the appropriate backup matrices yields a 
Nash policy pair for the global stochastic game. 
Similarly, a security selection function f returns a pair 
of mixed strategies f ( M1, M2) = (a, /3) that are a secu­
rity pair for (M1, M2). In this case we use v'(M1, M2) 
to denote the security level of player k in the game 
(M1, M2). For both Nash and security selection func­
tions, we denote the row and column strategies re­
turned by f by !J(M1, M2) and h(M1, M2), respec­
tively. 
3 FINITE VALUE ITERATION IN 
GENERAL S TOCHAS TIC GAMES 
We begin by describing a finite-horizon, undiscounted 
value iteration algorithm for general-sum stochastic 
games, given in Figure 1. This algorithm and its anal­
ysis are a straightforward generalization of classical 
finite-horizon value iteration in Markov decision pro­
cesses, but form a necessary basis for our large state­
space algorithm and analysis. 
The algorithm outputs a pair of time-dependent poli­
cies 1I"k(s, t), k E {1, 2}, mapping any state s and 
the time remaining t :::; T to a mixed strategy for 
player k. The algorithm assumes access to an arbi-
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Algorithm FiniteVI(T): 
Initialization: 
For all s E S, k E 1, 2: 
Qk[s, O] � Mk[s]; 
nk(s, 0) � /k(Ml[s], M2[s]); 
Iteration t = 1 . . . T: 
For all s E S, k E { 1, 2}: 
For all pure strategies i and j: 
Qk[s, t](i , j) � Mk[s](i, j) + L:s' P(s'is, i, j)vj(Qds', t- 1], Q2[s', t- 1]); 
nk(s, t) � fk(Ql[s, t], Q2[s, t]); 
Return the policy pair ( 1r1, 1r2); 
Figure 1: Algorithm FiniteVI for computing Nash equilibria in finite-horizon undiscounted stochastic games. Recall 
that f is an arbitrary Nash selection function, /k extracts the mixed strategy selected by f for player k, and vj extracts 
the value of the selected Nash to player k. 
trary, fixed stochastic game G (specifying the payoff 
matrices (M1[s], M8[s]) and the transition probabili­
ties P(s'ls, i, j) for every state), and an arbitrary, fixed 
Nash selection function f .  We will show that the algo­
rithm outputs a pair of policies that are a Nash equi­
librium for the T-step stochastic game from any start 
state. The running time is quadratic in the number of 
states. 
The algorithm must maintain backup matrices at each 
step rather than just backup values. The main obser­
vation behind the algorithm is the fact that choices be­
tween the many global Nash equilibria for the T-step 
stochastic game can be implicitly made by applica­
tion of an arbitrary Nash selection function. The algo­
rithm also bears similarity to the infinite-horizon dis­
counted value iteration algorithm studied by Shapley 
(1953), which we revisit in Section 5. While Shapley 
proved that the infinite-horizon discounted algorithm 
converges to a Nash equilibrium in the zero-sum case 
(and indeed, as we shall show, does not converge in 
the general-sum case), the main result of this section 
shows that our finite-horizon algorithm converges to 
Nash in the general-sum setting. 
Theorem 1 Let G be any stochastic game, and let f 
be any Nash selection function. Then the policy pair 
7rk(s, t) output by Finite VI(!) is a Nash pair for the 
T -step stochastic game G from any start state. 
Proof: The proof is by induction on the number of 
steps T. The base case T = 0 is straightforward. If the 
start state is s0, and this is the only step of play, then 
clearly the players should play a Nash pair for the game 
(Ml[so], M2[s0]) defined at so. Since the initialization 
step given in algorithm Finite VI explicitly specifies 
that the 7rk(s0, 0) are simply the Nash pair identified 
by the Nash selection function f ,  this will be satisfied. 
Now suppose the theorem holds for all T < T0. Let 
us fix the policy played by player 2 to be n2 ( s, t) for 
all states s and time remaining t � T0, and con­
sider whether player 1 could benefit by deviating from 
n2(s, t). By the inductive hypothesis, player 1 cannot 
benefit by deviating at any point after the first step 
of play at s0. At the first step of play, since player 2 
is playing according to n2 ( s0, T0) , he will play his half 
of the Nash pair for the game (Ql[so, To], Q2[so, To]) 
chosen by the Nash selection function f. Furthermore, 
since play after the first step must be the Nash pair 
computed by the algorithm for the T0 - 1 step game, 
the matrices Qk[s0, To] contain the true total average 
return received by the players under any choice of ini­
tial actions at so. Therefore player 1 cannot bene­
fit by deviating from the choice of action dictated by 
n(so, To), and the theorem is proved. O(Theorem 1) 
4 A S PARS E SAMPLING 
ALGORITHM IN LARGE GAMES 
Algorithm Finite VI computes full expectations over 
next states in order to compute the backup matri­
ces Qk[s, t], and thus has a running time that scales 
quadratically with the number of states in the stochas­
tic game. In contrast, in this section we present 
a sparse sampling algorithm for on-line planning in 
stochastic games. The per-state running time of this 
algorithm has no dependence on the state space size, 
and thus can be applied even to infinite state spaces, 
but it depends exponentially on the horizon time T. 
This is exactly the trade-off examined in the work of 
Kearns, Mansour and Ng (1999) (see also McAllester 
and Singh (1999)), who gave an on-line algorithm for 
the simpler problem of computing near-optimal poli­
cies in large Markov decision processes. The algorithm 
presented here can be viewed as a generalization of al­
gorithm Finite VI that extends the sparse sampling 
methods of these earlier works to the problem of com-
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puting Nash equilibria in large or infinite state spaces. 
Algorithm SparseGame, which is presented in Fig­
ure 2, takes as input any state s and time T. It 
assumes access to an arbitrary, fixed Nash selection 
function f .  Rather than directly accessing full transi­
tion distributions for the underlying stochastic game 
G, the algorithm only assumes access to the immedi­
ate payoff matrices Mk [s], and the ability to sample 
P(·ls, i,j) for any (i,j). This is sometimes referred to 
as a generative model or simulator for the stochastic 
game. The algorithm returns a mixed strategy pair 
(a, (3) to be played at s, along with values Q1 and Q2, 
whose properties we will discuss shortly. 
The only aspect of the algorithm that has been left 
unspecified is the sample size m of next states drawn. 
Note that due to the recursion, a call to SparseGame 
will build a recursive tree of size m T, so the overall 
running time of the algorithm will be exponential in 
T. The question of interest is how large we must make 
m. 
Algorithm SparseGame is an on-line or local algo­
rithm in the sense that it takes a single state s and 
the amount of time remaining T, and produces a mixed 
strategy pair (a,/3). This algorithm, however, defines 
an obvious (global) policy for player k in the stochas­
tic game: namely, upon arriving in any state s with 
T steps left in the finite-horizon game, play the mixed 
strategy for player k output by SparseGame(s, T). 
Our goal is to prove that for a choice of m with no de­
pendence on the state space size, these global policies 
are near-Nash - that is, if one player chooses to al­
ways play their half of the mixed strategy pairs output 
by the algorithm at each state visited, then the other 
player cannot benefit much by deviating from the same 
policy. This result will be derived via a series of techni­
cal lemmas. We begin with some necessary definitions. 
For any s and T, we define Vk[s, T] to be the expected 
return to player k in the T -step game starting at s 
when both players play according to SparseGame at 
every step. For any pure strategy pair (i,j), we define 
Vk[s,T](i,j) to be the expected return to player kin 
the T -step game starting at s when the first step play 
at s is restricted to be ( i, j), and both players play 
according to SparseGame at every step afterwards. 
It will be fruitful to view the values Qk returned by 
the call SparseGame(s, T) as approximations to the 
Vk [ s, T], and to view the related matrices Q k [ s, T] ( i, j) 
computed by this call as approximations to the matri­
ces Vk[s, T](i,j). This view will be formally supported 
by a lemma shortly. 
We define Bk [s, T] to be the expected return to player 
k when we fix their opponent to play according to 
SparseGame at every step, and player k plays the 
best response policy - that is, the policy that maxi­
mizes their return given that their opponent plays ac­
cording to SparseGame. (It is not important that 
we be able to compute this best response, since it is 
merely an artifact of the analysis.) Similarly, we de­
fine Bk[s,T](i,j) to be the expected return to player 
k when the first step of play at s is restricted to be 
( i, j), we fix the opponent of player k to play accord­
ing to SparseGame afterwards, player k plays the 
best response policy afterwards. 
In this terminology, the main theorem we would like 
to prove asserts that for any s and T, the Vk [s, T] 
(the values the players will receive by following the 
algorithm) are near the Bk[s, T] (the values the players 
could obtain by deviating from the algorithm if their 
opponent follows the algorithm), for a sufficiently large 
sample size that is independent of the state space size. 
Theorem 2 For any s and T, and for any t > 0, 
provided the sample size m in algorithm SparseGame 
obeys 
for some constant c (where n is the number of pure 
strategies available to both players at any state), then 
IBk [s, T] - vk [s, T]l :::; 2Tt. In other words, the policy 
of always playing according to SparseGame is 2Tt­
Nash for the T -step game starting at s . 
Proof: All expectations in the proof are over 
all the random samples generated by the call 
SparseGame(s, T) (including the random samples 
generated by the recursive calls). We begin by not­
ing: 
IBk[s,T]- Vk[s,T]I E[IBk[s,T]- Vk[s,TJIJ 
< E [ IBk[s, T]- Qk[s, TJI
] 
+ 
E [ IQk[s, T]- Vk[s, TJI) 
by the triangle inequality and linearity of expectation. 
We now state a lemma bounding the second expecta­
tion in this sum, and also bounding a related quantity 
that we will need later. 
Lemma 3 For any s and T, and for any t > 0, pro­
vided the sample size m in algorithm SparseGame 
obeys 
for some constant c (where n is the number of pure 
strategies available to both players at any state}, then 
E [ IQk[s, T]- Vk[s, TJI] :::; t 
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Algorithm SparseGame(s, T): 
If T = 0 (base case) : 
a+- JI(M1[8], M2[8]); 
f3 +- h(M1[8], M2[s]); 
For k E {1, 2}, Qk +- Mk[8](a, {3); 
Return (a, {3, Q1, Q2); 
I* Else need to recurse below *I 
For each pure strategy pair ( i, j): 
Sample 8�, ... , 8� from P(-18, i, j); 
Fore= 1, ... , m: 
(a', {3', Ql[8£, T- 1], Q2[s£, T- 1]) +- SparseGame(s£, T- 1); 
For k E {1, 2}, Qk[s, T](i, j) +- Mk[s] + (1/m) 2::;':1 Qk[8£, T- 1); 
a+- h(Ql[s, T], Q2[8, T]); 
{3 +- h(Q1[8, T], Q2[s, T]); 
For k E {1, 2}, Qk = Qk[s, T](a, {3); 
Return (a, {3, Q1, Q2); 
Figure 2: Algorithm SparseGame for computing one step of an approximate Nash equilibrium in a large stochastic 
game. The algorithm assumes only access to a generative model of the game. Recall that f is an arbitrary Nash selection 
function, /k extracts the mixed strategy selected by f for player k, and vj extracts the value of the selected Nash to 
player k. 
and 
E [max{IVk[8, T)(i, j)- Qk[s, T](i, j)l}] ::; f. ( •,J) 
Proof: By induction on T, we show that the prob­
ability that IQk[s, T]- Vk[8, T)l :2: >.T is bounded by 
some quantity 6r, and that for any fixed (i, j), the 
probability that 1Qk[8, T](i, j)- Vk[s, T](i, j)l :2: >.T is 
bounded by some quantity s;.,. These bounds will then 
be used to bound the expectations of interest. 
For the base case T = 0, we have 6r = J!r = 0 . 
Assume the inductive hypothesis holds for horizon 
times 1, ... , T - 1. We define the random variable 
Uk [8, T]( i, j) = (1Im) 2::;':1 Vk [s£, T-1], where the s£ 
are the states sampled in the call SparseGame(8, T). 
By the triangle inequality we may write 
1Qk[8, T](i, j) - Vk[s, T)(i, j)l 
< IQk[s, T](i, j)- Uk[s, T](i, j)l + 
IUk[s, T](i, j) - Vk[s, T](i, j)l. 
For the second term in this sum, the probability of the 
event 1Uk[8, T](i, j)-Vk[s, T](i, j)l :2: >.can be bounded 
by e-.>.2m via a standard Chernoff bound analysis. In 
order to bound the first term in the sum, we note that 
by definition, 
Qk[s, T](i, j)- Uk[s, T](i, j) = 
m 
By the inductive hypothesis, for each state s£, we have 
with probability 1-6r_1. This implies that with prob­
ability 1-mJr-1, the bound applies to all the sampled 
states s£. In such a case we have that for any fixed (i,j) 
IQk[s, T](i, j)- Uk[8, T](i, j)l::; >.(T- 1). 
Therefore, with probability 
1- J!r ='= 1- (mJT-1 + e-.>.2m) 
we have that 
IQ k [8, T] ( i, j) - vk [s, T]( i, j) I ::; >.T. 
This completes the proof for the second half of the 
inductive hypothesis. For the first half of the inductive 
hypothesis we have 
IQk[s, T]- Vk[s, T]I::; maxiQk[s, T](i, j)- Vk[s, T](i, j)l. 
(i,j) 
This implies that with probability 1 - 6r = 1 - n26!r 
we have 
which completes the proof of the first half of the in­
ductive hypothesis. 
We would like to use the inductive hypothesis to prove 
the lemma. By the definition of 6r we have 
E 
[IQk[s, T]- Vk[8, TJI] ::; 6r + >.T. 
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Here we have used the assumption that Rmax :S 1. 
Now we need to solve for 8r in the recurrence set up 
above: 
8r = n 28� = n2(m8r-I + e->.2m) :S (n2mf n2e->.2m . 
To complete the proof we set .X= Ej2T and 
m > (2T/.X2) log(T/.X2) + Tlog(2n2 /E)+ 2 log(n). 
Thus 
m = 0( (T3 / E 2) log(T /E) + T log(n / E)). 
The second bound of the lemma follows since with 
probability at most n 28� we have 
max{/Vk[s, T](i,j)- Qk[s, T](i,j)/} 2 .XT ( >,J) 
which completes the proof of the lemma. D(Lemma 3) 
Returning to the main development, we have in­
curred an approximation cost E by applying Lemma 3, 
and in exchange have reduced the task of bound­
ing /Bk[s, T] - Vk[s, T]/ to the problem of bounding 
E [ /Bk[s,T]- Qk[s,TJ/] . For this we need the follow­
ing general lemma. 
Lemma 4 Let (M1,M2) and (lVh,Mz) be general­
sum matrix games such that for all pure strategy 
pairs (i,j), /Mk(i,j)- Mk(i,j)/ :S �fork E {1, 2}. 
Then if the mixed strategy pair (a, {3) is a Nash in 
( M1, Mz) , for any mixed strategy pair (a', {3) we have 
M1(a',{3)- M1(a,{3) :S �. 
Proof: It is easy to see that for any (a, {3) and k E 
{1,2}, /Mk(a,{3)- Mk(a,f3)/ :S �. Now fix (a,{3) to 
be some Nash pair in (M1, M2). This implies that for 
any a' we have M1(a',{3) :S M1(a,{3). Combining the 
two observations we have that 
M1(a',{3) :S M1(a',{3) + � 
:S M1(a,{3) + �. 
D(Lemma 4) 
Recall that by definition of SparseGame, Qk[s, T] 
is obtained by computing a Nash equilibrium (a, {3) 
(determined by the fixed Nash selection function) of 
the matrices Qk[s, T](i,j), and setting (for example) 
Q1[s,T] = QI[s,T](a,{3). Application of Lemma 4 
now lets us write 
E [ /Bk[s, T]- Qk[s, TJ/] 
< E [�ax{/Bk[s,T](i,j)- Qk[s,T](i,j)/}] 
( >,J) 
< E [m�{/Bk[s,T](i,j)- Vk[s,T](i,j)/}] (>,J) 
+E [max{/Vk[s, T](i,j)- Qk[s, T](i,j)/}] . 
{i,j) 
The second expectation in this sum, by Lemma 3, is 
bounded by E, incurring our second E approximation 
cost. The first expectation no longer involves any ran­
dom variables, so we may remove the expectation and 
concentrate on bounding 
�ax{/Bk[s, T](i,j)- Vk[s, T](i,j)/}. 
( >,J) 
For each fixed ( i, j), the difference 
/Bk [s, T](i, j)- Vk[s, T](i, j)/ 
is just like the quantity we are attempting to bound 
in the theorem, but now we have fixed the first step 
of play to be ( i, j) and there are only T - 1 steps af­
terwards. Thus we may apply a simple inductive ar­
gument: 
/Bk[s, T](i, j) - Vk [s, T](i, j)/ 
�  P(s'/s, i,j)(Bk[s', T- 1]- Vk[s', T - 1])1 
< max{/Bk[s',T- 1]- Vk[s',T- 1]/} . s' 
This implies that we have 
max{/Bk[s, T]- Vk[s, T]/} s 
< 2 E  + max{/Bk[s, T- 1]- Vk[s, T- 1]}/ s 
< 2TE. 
D(Theorem 2) 
To apply Theorem 2, note that if we set E = E1 /T 
in the statement of the theorem and compute the re­
sulting m (which is polynomial in T and 1/E'), then 
the policies computed by the algorithm will be E1-Nash 
for the T-step stochastic game, and as already empha­
sized, the total per-state running time will be m T. As 
mentioned in the introduction, it is important that the 
players play their respective halves of a common copy 
of the algorithm (a correlated equilibrium); playing an 
independent copy may not be a Nash strategy in some 
games. Briefly, the reason for this is that small vari­
ations in sampling may result in instabilities in the 
backup matrices computed. This instability is not a 
problem as long as both players adhere to a common 
run of the algorithm. 
5 INFINITE VALUE ITERATION 
IN S TOCHAS TIC GAMES 
So far we have presented an exact algorithm for com­
puting Nash policy pairs in stochastic games with 
small state spaces, and a sparse sampling algorithm for 
computing approximately Nash policy pairs in large 
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Algorithm InfiniteVI(T): 
Initialization: for all s E S, k E 1, 2: 
Qk(s,O] +--- Mk[s]; 
nk(s) +--- fk(MI[s], M2[s]); 
Iteration t = 1, ... , T: for all s E S, k E {1, 2}: 
For all pure strategies i and j: 
Qk[s, t](i,j) +--- Mk[s](i,j) + 'Y I:., P(s'is, i,j)vj (Qds', t- 1], Q2[s', t- 1]); 
1fk(s) +--- fk(QI[s, t], Q2[s, t]); 
Return the policy pair ( 1r1, 1r2); 
Figure 3: Algorithm lnfiniteVI for computing a security pair in infinite-horizon discounted stochastic games. Here f 
is an arbitrary security selection function, fk extracts the mixed strategy selected by f for player k, and vj extracts the 
security level of the selected strategy to player k. 
stochastic games. Both of these algorithms applied 
to the T-step average return setting. In this section, 
we examine the situation for the infinite horizon dis­
counted return setting, and find some curious differ­
ence with the finite horizon case. In particular, we 
provide a small generalization of the classical result 
of Shapley on value iteration in the zero-sum case, 
but also provide a counterexample proving that the 
algorithm cannot (in a fairly strong sense) converge to 
Nash in the general-sum setting. 
In Figure 3, we present a value iteration algorithm for 
the infinite-horizon discounted setting. This algorithm 
is quite similar to Finite VI, except that the output 
policies 1fk ( s) are now independent of time, and the 
discount factor is incorporated into the backup matri­
ces computed at each step. 
We now present a slight generalization of a classical re­
sult of Shapley (1953) on the convergence of infinite­
horizon value iteration. Shapley proved the conver­
gence in the case of zero-sum stochastic games, where 
the notions of Nash and security coincide. Here we 
give a more general analysis proving convergence to a 
security strategy in the general-sum setting. 
Theorem 5 Let G be any stochastic game, and let f 
be any security selection function. Then as T -t oo, 
the policy pair 1fk ( s) output by Infinite VI(T) con­
verges to a security pair for the infinite-horizon dis­
counted stochastic game G from any start state. 
A very natural question to ask about algorithm In­
finite VI is: if we allow the arbitrary security selection 
function f to be replaced by an arbitrary Nash selec­
tion function, can we prove the generalization of The­
orem 5 in which convergence to a security pair is re­
placed by convergence to a Nash pair? This would pro­
vide the infinite-horizon discounted analogue to The­
orem 1 for the finite-horizon case. 
In the full paper, we provide a counterexample prov­
ing that such a generalization is not possible. The 
counterexample is rather strong in several dimensions. 
First, it applies even to any fixed choice of Nash se­
lection function. In other words, the difficulty does 
not lie in the generality of the Nash selection function, 
and particular choices or conditions on this function 
will not help. Second, the counterexample is such that 
there will be infinitely many time steps at which the 
policies currently computed by the algorithm are not 
even an approximate Nash pair. Thus, unlike the MDP 
setting, in stochastic games there is a significant dif­
ference in the convergence status of value iteration in 
the finite-horizon and infinite-horizon cases. 
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